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Pursuant to provisions of Rule 47(c), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Smith's Management Corporation ("Smith's") files this
cross-petition for writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the court of appeals erroneously determine that the

trial court had erred in partially directing verdict as to activities of Smith's prior to the time it knew Mr. Burnett was committing a crime and apprehended him?

COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The court of appeals opinion, Steffensen v. Smith's Management
Corp., 172 Utah Adv. Rep 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) was issued on
October 29, 1991 and is enclosed as Appendix A. Mrs. Steffensen's
petition for rehearing was denied on November 19, 1991; the denial
was filed on November 20, 1991.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner has exhausted her remedies before the court of
appeals, giving this Court jurisdiction to consider her petition
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991). The Court
may consider Smith's cross-petition pursuant to the same statute
and provisions in Rule 47, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This
cross-petition is timely in that Petitioner filed the petition for
Writ of Certiorari on December 18, 1991, and as required by Rule
48(d)(2), this cross-petition has been filed within thirty (30)
days of such filing by Petitioner.

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules pertinent to the question prevented for review are contained in the body
of this petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Smith's accepts petitioner's statement of the case.

It is

important to note that Mr. Burnett was peacefully apprehended and
that his attempt to escape occurred after apprehension while he
was being conducted to the manager's office.

Steffensen v.

Smith's, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36-37.

ARGUMENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW, SMITH'S OWED NO DUTY TO PROTECT MRS.
STEFFENSEN FROM ACTS OF A SHOPLIFTER PRIOR TO HAVING
KNOWLEDGE THAT A CRIME WAS BEING COMMITTED. THEREFORE,
EVIDENCE OF ACTIONS PRIOR TO THAT POINT ARE IRRELEVANT
AS TO SMITH'S LIABILITY AND WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED BY THE
TRIAL COURT.
It is appropriate for the trial court to exclude evidence from
the jury.

E.g., Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.

A

directed verdict which precludes the jury from considering certain
evidence and avoiding

having the

jury come to a conclusion

inconsistent with established law is one such method for excluding
evidence.

A motion for directed verdict has been described as "a

method of testing the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented."
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611
(Utah 1982).

In deciding a motion for directed verdict, the trial

court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the
party against whom the verdict is directed.

2

Id.

In a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, that the duty was breached
and that the breach proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.
If, as a matter of law, the defendant owed no such duty, then
evidence related to the claimed breach is unnecessary and possibly
confusing to the jury making it legally insufficient for consideration by the jury.
Utah law imposes no duty on Smith's prior to the time it knows
that a criminal act is likely to occur.
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991).

Dwiqqins v. Morgan

A business owner is not an

insurer of the safety of its business invitees.

Id.

Comment f to section 344 [Restatement, (Second)
Torts] makes it clear that the possessor "is
ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care
until he knows or has reason to know that the
acts of the third person are occurring, or are
about to occur." (Emphasis added.) Consistent
with our earlier cases, we follow the
Restatement and hold that this duty exists in
Utah, but recognize that the duty does not
arise until the business owner knows, or should
know, that criminal acts are likely to occur.
Dwiqqins at 183 (emphasis in original).

If there is no duty, a

court need not address secondary issues related to the negligence
claims.

Id.

The evidence presented at trial did not show that Smith's knew
or should have known that Mr. Burnett was going to commit a crime.
As far as Smith's knew, Mr. Burnett was a paying customer until
such time as he left the checkstand area without paying, at which
time he was immediately apprehended.
owed

no duty

to Mrs. Steffensen

As a matter of law, Smith's
until

the crime was being

committed, at which time they apprehended Mr. Burnett.

3

The trial

court properly held that, prior to the time of apprehension, there
was no duty and therefore the acts prior to apprehension could not
proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.
trial

court's

partial

verdict

regarding

On that basis, the

the

pre-apprehension

conduct of Smith's employees, was directed.
The partial directed verdict was proper in this case. A holding of the court of appeals that it is error would saddle trial
courts with an immense burden which would limit their discretion
in excluding evidence.

Every time a trial court ruled to exclude

evidence, a party could object that the court was improperly
directing a verdict.

It would become virtually impossible to

exclude unnecessary or irrelevant evidence at the trial level.

CONCLUSION
If this Court grants Mrs. Steffensen's petition and issues a
writ of certiorari, it must also grant Smith's cross-petition to
fairly consider the impact of this case in its entirety.

As a

practical matter, this Court will be unable to determine that the
court of appeals improperly applied a harmless error analysis
without determining the root issue of whether there was error on
which to base that analysis.
Respectfully submitted the /* "] day of January, 1992.

BJrfistopher A. T o l b o e
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circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103
S. Ct. at 2332. Here, Buford's prior drug
related history, the circumstances of Rodriguez's unwitting buy, and the presence of
drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view of
police officers following forced entry under
exigent circumstances, all set forth in the affidavit, provided the magistrate with the required "'substantial basis for ... concluding]'
that probable cause existed." Id. 462 U.S. at
238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct.
725,736(1960)).
In conclusion, we find that based on the
totality of the circumstances presented in the
affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial
basis for finding that probable cause existed
for issuance of the warrant. We therefore
affirm Buford's conviction.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465
(Utah 1990); Stare v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 147-48
(Utah App. 1991), cerf. denied, __Utah Adv. Rep
(Utah 1991).
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a
negligence action. Plaintiff Pearl Steffensen
was injured in defendant Smith's Management
Corporation's ("Smith") grocery store by a
shoplifter attempting to flee from the store's
management. The jury found Smith was negligent, but the negligence was not the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. On
appeal, Mrs. Steffensen asserts the trial court
improperly: (1) ruled Smith's failure to train
its employees as to the appropriate methods to
deal with shoplifters or to deter shoplifting
was not, as a matter of law, the proximate
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury; (2) charged
the jury on the law of foreseeability; and (3)
excluded certain expert testimony. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered
a Smith's grocery store to shoplift beer and
cigarettes. Gary Canham, the store's frontend manager, observed Mr. Burnett take beer
and cigarettes from the store's shelves. As Mr.
Burnett walked toward the front of the store,
Mr. Canham suspected Mr. Burnett might
attempt to leave the store without paying for
the merchandise. Mr. Canham immediately
informed Paul Rompus, Smith's Drug King
manager, and together the two watched Mr.
Burnett from the office area at the front of
the store. As Mr. Burnett walked toward the
front of the store, he noticed the two managers and felt they were watching him. Accordingly, Mr. Burnett got in line at a check-out
stand. As soon as Mr. Burnett felt he was no
longer being watched, he got out of line and
walked quickly toward the door with the
merchandise.
The two managers then confronted Mr.
Burnett and asked him to come with them to
their office. As the three walked toward the
office, Mr. Rompus called out to another
employee at the front of the store, telling her
to call the police. As the group reached the
office area, Mr. Burnett turned and "broke"
toward the exit, dropping the beer and cigarettes as he ran. Mr. Rompus yelled "stop him-see if you can stop him," in an effort to
engage the assistance of others. Responding to
the call for help, another employee attempted
to stop Mr. Burnett by assuming a football
blocking stance in the aisle. Mr. Burnett
dodged this employee, turning in a different
direction, and as he did so, ran directly into
another employee. Mr. Burnett "bounced" off
this employee directly into the plaintiff, Mrs.
Steffensen, who was standing at the customer
service counter writing a check. The force of
the collision knocked Mrs. Steffensen to the
ground, where she struck her head on the tile
floor. Mrs. Steffensen was taken to the hospital and has since suffered severe "stroke-
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like" paralysis to the entire left side of her
body.
Subsequently, Mrs. Steffensen commenced
this action against Smith, claiming Smith was
negligent in dealing with Mr. Burnett and that
this negligence caused her injury. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence,
defense counsel moved for a partial directed
verdict on the grounds that Smith's failure to
deter Mr. Burnett from shoplifting could not,
as a matter of law, be a proximate cause of
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. The trial judge
granted the motion and incorporated this
ruling in his instructions to the jury. At the
conclusion of trial, the judge submitted
written interrogatories to the jury. After deliberation, the jury found Smith had acted
negligently, but Smith's negligence did not
proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
1. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Mrs. Steffensen's first claim of error is the
trial court improperly granted Smith a partial
directed verdict on the element of proximate
causation. During the trial, Mrs. Steffensen
proceeded on two theories of negligence. First,
Mrs. Steffensen asserted Smith had been
negligent in failing to train its employees to
use techniques to "deter" Mr. Burnett from
shoplifting and, alternatively, that Smith's
employees negligently failed to utilize these
techniques in dealing with Mr. Burnett.
Second, Mrs. Steffensen claimed Smith was
negligent in chasing and attempting to stop
Mr. Burnett after he broke away and ran.
Mrs. Steffensen argued that both of these acts
of negligence endangered the safety of Smith's
customers and ultimately caused her injuries.
At the close of evidence, Smith asked the
trial judge for a partial directed verdict, ruling
that as a matter of law, even if its employees
had been inadequately trained about the need
for deterrence and failed to utilize deterrence,
such failure was not the proximate cause of
Mrs. Steffensen's injury. The trial court
granted Smith's request and instructed the
jury that all Smith's conduct prior to the stop
and detention of Mr. Burnett should not be
considered by the jury:1
You have heard testimony regarding
events that occurred prior to the
time of the stop of the shoplifter,
Mr. Burnett.
You are instructed that none of the
actions of the Smith's employees
prior to the stop and detention
proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, you must not take
this testimony into consideration
when deliberating and making your
decision.
A directed verdict is only appropriate when
the court is able to conclude that reasonable
minds would not differ on the facts to be

Management Corp.
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determined from the evidence presented.
Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines, Inc.,
652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). A directed
verdict cannot stand when, reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the losing
party, "there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in [the
losing party's] favor." Id. at 898; see Penrod
v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987).
Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial judge's jury
instruction concerning pre-apprehension
evidence was improper because reasonable
minds could differ as to whether a failure to
"deter" Mr. Burnett from shoplifting was the
proximate cause of her injuries.
In Utah, a negligence claim requires the
plaintiff to establish four elements: that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; that
defendant breached the duty (negligence); that
the breach of the duty was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury; and that there was
in fact injury. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d
111, 116 (Utah 1991). Proximate cause is "that
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause), produces the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred. It is the
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets
in operation the factors that accomplish the
injury." State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 &
n.2 (Utah 1984). Further, there can be more
than one proximate cause of an injury so long
as each is a concurrent contributing factor in
causing the injury. See Anderson v. Parson
Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128,
467 P.2d 45, 46 (1970); Jaques v. Farrimond,
14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134 (1963).
It is well established that the question of
proximate cause is generally reserved for the
jury. Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d
541, 544 (Utah 1984); Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co, Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah App.
1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah
1990). Only in rare cases may a trial judge rule
as a matter of law on the issue of proximate
causation.
This principle is illustrated by several Utah
Supreme Court decisions. In Harris v. Utah
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983),
the passenger of a jeep brought an action
against a bus company and the jeep driver for
injuries sustained in a traffic accident. The
trial court granted the bus company a directed
verdict, instructing the jury that if they found
the jeep driver should have observed the bus
prior to the accident, they must find, as a
matter of law, that the jeep driver was the sole
proximate cause of the accident. On appeal,
the plaintiff claimed that a jury could infer
that the bus negligently contributed to the
accident and pointed to allegations that the
bus stopped too rapidly, failed to drive out of
the lane of traffic, and had faulty brake lights.
Id. at 220. The Utah Supreme Court agreed
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with the plaintiff and reversed the directed in the room, summary judgment on the issue
verdict. The Harris court held it improper for of proximate causation was proper.
In sum, the issue of proximate cause should
the trial judge to have taken the issue of proximate cause from the jury. The court expla- be taken from the jury only where: (1) there is
ined: "Where the evidence is in dispute inclu- no evidence to establish a causal connection,
ding the inferences from the evidence, the thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or
issue should be submitted to the jury." Id.
(2) where reasonable persons could not differ
Likewise, in Jensen v. Mountain States on the inferences to be derived from the eviTelephone & Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 dence on proximate causation. Robertson v.
(Utah 1980), the trial judge granted defendant Sixpence Inns of America, Inc., 163 Ariz. 539,
summary judgment on the issue of proximate 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990)(en banc).
cause in an action where the plaintiff had been
Smith argues that its failure to deter Mr.
injured in an automobile accident. The plain- Burnett could not have been the proximate
tiff claimed he was unable to see approaching cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury because
traffic in executing a left-hand turn because there was not an unbroken causal line between
a van owned by the defendant utility company this failure and Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
negligently blocked his view by remaining in Specifically, Smith argues the act of apprehethe intersection, and this was an intervening nding Mr. Burnett, Mr. Burnett's decision to
proximate cause of the accident. On appeal, run, and Mr. Burnett's physical encounter
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the with Smith's employees, were, as a matter of
summary judgment on the issue of proximate law, intervening proximate causes and therecause. The court held that the issue of proxi- fore broke the chain of causation flowing
mate cause may only be taken from the jury from its failure to deter.
where reasonable minds could not differ as to
Smith correctly asserts that "a more recent
what "was or was not the proximate cause of negligent act may break the chain of causation
the injury." Id. at 365 n.4. The court concl- and relieve the liability of a prior negligent
uded that "in a situation involving indepen- actor under the proper circumstances."
dent intervening cause, the primary issue is Godesky, 690 P.2d at 544. However, if the
one of the foreseeability of the subsequent subsequent negligent act is foreseeable to the
negligent conduct of a third person, and in prior actor, both acts are concurring causes
this case, [the issue of proximate cause] must and the prior actor is not absolved of liability.
be resolved by the finder of fact." Id. at 365 Id. The issue is whether the subsequent inter(emphasis added).
vening conduct, either criminal or negligent,
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 545; Harris,
240 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 671 P.2d at 220. "A superseding cause, suffiupheld the trial court's summary judgment for cient to become the proximate cause of the
defendant on the issue of proximate causation final result and relieve defendant of liability
because the court found no evidence of prox- for his original negligence, arises only when an
imate cause and determined that, without intervening force was unforeseeable and may
evidence, the issue would have been left to be described with the benefit of hindsight, as
juror speculation. In Mitchell, dependents of a extraordinary." Robertson, 789 P.2d at 1047.2
murdered hotel guest brought a wrongful The fact that the final act which produces the
death action against the hotel after the dece- injury is the criminal conduct of a third party
ased had been unexplainedly murdered in his does not preclude the finding that an earlier
hotel room. Plaintiffs sought to prove that the negligent act was the proximate cause of
hotel management was negligent in its security injury if the criminal conduct was, under the
measures and that such negligence proximately circumstances, reasonably foreseeable. Robecaused the murder. On appeal, the Utah rtson, 789 P.2d at 1047; Mitchell, 697 P.2d at
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's 246.
summary judgment for the defendant. The
First, Smith cannot rely on its own subseqcourt held that because there was no evidence uent acts of negligence to break the chain of
as to how the murderer entered the deceased's causation between an earlier act of negligence
room, plaintiffs had failed to show a factual and the injury. Only the unforeseeable acts of
connection between the negligent security another constitute an intervening proximate
measures and the murder. The Mitchell court cause. See State v. Marty, 166 Ariz. 233, 801
recognized that the murderer could have P.2d 468, 472 (Ct. App. 1990); People v.
entered the room in a number of ways, many Gentry, 738 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Colo. 1987); State
of which would have had no connection with v. Neher, 52 Wash. App. 298, 759 P.2d
the hotel's security measures, including by 475, 476 (1988), aff'd, 112 Wash. 2d 347, 771
invitation of the deceased. Because plaintiffs P.2d 330 (1989). To hold otherwise would
bore the burden to show defendant's conduct allow tortfeasors to escape liability by comwas a "substantial causative factor that led to mitting additional acts of negligence following
the [guest's] death," id. at 246, and because an initial breach of a duty. Therefore, Smith's
plaintiffs had offered no evidence other than apprehension of Mr. Burnett and the subseqmere speculation as to how the murderer got uent chase through the store did not break the
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chain of causation
Smith's failure to deter Mr Burnett was not a
Likewise, we are hesitant to say, as a matter contributing proximate cause of Mrs Steffe
of law, that Mr Burnett's acts following nsen's injury There was probably sufficient
apprehension broke the chain of causation evidence produced from which a reasonable
between Smith's failure to deter Mr Burnett juror could infer that Smith's failure to deter
and Mrs. Steffensen's injury Substantial was a negligent act,5 as it would have been
evidence before the jury indicated that Smith reasonably foreseeable to an adequately
could have reasonably foreseen a customer trained employee that his or her decision to
would be injured by a shoplifter's decision to apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store
run, particularly when, instead of deterring the could have led to a customer's injury
shoplifter, Smith chose to "play cat and
However, this does not end our inquiry If
mouse"' with him Certainly Mrs Steffensen the trial court's partial directed verdict was
presented evidence on this theory of causation
harmless error, we need not reverse See Utah
A closer question is whether any reasonable R Civ P 61 (1991), State v Verde, 770 P 2d
juror could conclude that the evidence and all
116, 120 (Utah 1989) On appeal, the appellant
reasonable inferences drawn trom it show has the burden oi demonstrating an error wdi>
Smith's failure to deter was a contributing prejudicial -that there is a ' reasonable likcause of Mrs Steffensen's injury
elihood that the error affected the outcome of
In this case, Mrs Steffensen introduced the proceedings " Verde, 770 P 2d at 120
substantial expert testimony that, in dealing Further, in determining whether a trial court's
with shoplifters, deterrence measures prevent error was harmful, we must look be>ond the
shoplifting and thus promote customer safety
mere fact of error and consider in totality all
During trial, Mrs Steffensen presented testi- the evidence and proceedings below See, e g ,
mony from security and shoplifting experts Anderson v Toone, 671 P 2d 170, 175 (Utah
who testified that Smith's employees failed to
1983) (erroneous jur> instruction not reversible
use reasonable means to handle Mr Burnett, a error when considered in light ot all instructsuspected shoplifter, sufficient to protect the ions and evidence) Although normally we
safety of the store's customers These experts would be reluctant to uphold an erroneous
identified two specific and generally accepted directed verdict on harmless error grounds, in
techniques that retail stores employ when this case we cannot ignore the fact that the
dealing with shoplifters and which Smith jury's verdict would not have differed had the
failed to implement First, the experts testified trial judge not granted Smith's partial directed
that a retail store should take steps to "deter" verdict.
a suspected shoplifter from carrying out his or
At trial, Mrs Steffensen presented substaher plan by taking such affirmative action as ntial evidence of Smith's negligence the
making direct eye contact with the suspected store's failure to deter Mr Burnett's shoplishoplifter, approaching the suspected shopli- fting, the negligent apprehension and holding
fter and offering assistance, and calling for of Mr Burnett, and the improper pursuit of
security over the public intercom system
Mr Burnett once he ran for the door The
Second, the experts testified that a retail store trial court's partial directed verdict removed
should also train its employees to use caie trom the jury's consideration only the portion
when apprehending a shoplifter The experts ol this evidence relating to Smith's actions
agreed that employees should not chase or use before Mr Burnett's apprehension In retur
force with a shoplifter who becomes violent or ning a verdict for the defendant on the remaflees. These experts testified that stores ining evidence, the jury found that although
employ, or should employ, such techniques Smith had acted negligently, the negligence did
primarily to protect the safety of their custo- not proximately cause Mrs Steffensen's injmers and to prevent incidents precisely like the uries Therefore, the jur> must have concluded
one which occurred in this case 3 In addition,
that either (1) the post-apprehension negliMrs Steffensen submitted copies of Smith's gence was too attenuated and remote from the
employee training manuals which advocated injury to constitute the proximate cause, or (2)
deterrence when dealing with shophfters 4 Mr
Mr Burnett's attempt to flee was an unfore
Burnett was, in fact, deterred when he thought seeable superseding proximate cause ol the
Smith's employees were watching while he was injury We cannot see how the jur> would
in the store. He went to get in the check out have reached a different conclusion had it
line and waited there until he believed he was been allowed to consider acts Smith perfonot being watched. Further, Mrs Steffensen's rmed, or failed to perform, prior to appreheexperts testified that approximately five nding Mr Burnett Accordingly, we find it
percent of all shophfters, when apprehended, highly unlikely the jury would have changed
run They likewise testified that the proper use its proximate cause decision had the trial judge
of deterrence techniques can reduce,, this submitted to them the issue of Smith's failure
number by reducing the number of shophfters to deter Mr Burnett's shoplifting Therefore,
as a whole
we find the trial court's partial directed
Thus, we are hesitant to uphold the trial verdict on the issue of proximate causation to
court's ruling that, as a matter of law, be, at most, harmless error
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Next, Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial court
incorrectly stated the law with regard to foreseeability when it instructed the jury concerning her second theory of negligence-the
post-apprehension chase. We review challenges to jury instructions under a "correctness"
standard. See Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1989).
The trial court's jury instruction number
thirty-two charged the jury that:
Foreseeability in these instructions
means injury or harm, if any, to a
customer which the defendant and
its employees could have reasonably
anticipated as the natural consequences of their actions, if any, even
though they were not able to anticipate the particular injury which
did occur. In determining what is
foreseeable, you must determine that

the actions

by Burnett

were

predictable by Smith's employees
and not just a mere possibility.
Mrs. Steffensen claims this instruction improperly focused on the particular acts of Mr.
Burnett, rather than focusing on shoplifters in
general. We agree that the specific identity of
the shoplifter is irrelevant to the question of
foreseeability. See Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183
(foreseeability that criminal act will occur
establishes duty). However, it is unnecessary
for us to reach the merits of Mrs. Steffensen*s
claim because any error committed by the trial
judge was harmless. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61
(1991); Verde, 770 P.2d at 120 (Utah 1989).
The question of foreseeability goes to the issue
of negligence, and the jury found Smith negligent. Therefore, any error in defining foreseeability did not affect the jury's verdict.
III. EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Mrs. Steffensen's next claim of error is the
trial judge improperly excluded portions of her
expert testimony. First, the trial court forbade
one of Mrs. Steffensen's experts from testifying about Smith's employee training practices
as they related to the way its employees handle
shoplifters. Second, the trial court did not
allow Mrs. Steffensen's expert to give an
opinion as to the relative proportion of fault
between Smith and Mr. Burnett. Challenges to
evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of
expert testimony, are reviewed under a deferential "clear error" standard. See Davidson v.
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427
(Utah App. 1990). Further, an appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating that the excluded
evidence could have influenced the jury to
render a different verdict. Anton v. Thomas,
806 P.2d 744,746 (Utah App. 1991).
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A. Testimony On Employee Training
Mrs. Steffensen contends the trial court
should have admitted expert testimony concerning Smith's failure to adequately train its
employees regarding the proper handling of
shoplifters, including techniques for deterring
shoplifting. At trial, the judge did not permit
Smith to introduce this expert testimony on
the grounds that Smith's failure to deter Mr.
Burnett could not have been the proximate
cause of the injury, and therefore the testimony was irrelevant.
Our resolution of the proximate cause issue
relating to shoplifter "deterrence" mandates a
finding that if this ruling was error, the error
was harmless. Furthermore, the exclusion of
any training evidence relating to Smith's
employees chasing Mr. Burnett was also harmless as the jury found Smith negligent in its
apprehension and chasing of Mr. Burnett.
B. Testimony Apportioning Fault
Mrs. Steffensen's final argument is that her
expert witness should have been allowed to
render an opinion concerning the relative fault
of Smith and Mr. Burnett. Smith contends the
trial court's ruling was correct because the
apportionment of fault requires the expert to
render a legal conclusion and is thus inadmissible under Utah law. We agree with Smith
that the apportionment of fault requires a
legal opinion and, therefore, such a determination should be reserved for the jury.
This court recently considered the question
of what expert opinions are permissible as
going to the "ultimate issue,"6 and what expert
opinions are inadmissible as "legal" conclusions. See Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1230-32. In
Davidson, we held the trial court properly
excluded an expert opinion which concluded
that the defendant was negligent. In doing so,
we stated that "[qjuestions which allow a
witness to simply tell a jury what result to
reach are not permitted." Id. at 1231. A
witness may testify as to the defendant's
actions, including whether the defendant acted
with care; however, the witness may not consider all the facts and render a final legal
conclusion. We find apportionment of fault
between parties to be exactly this type of
impermissible legal conclusion. It is for the
jury to place a legal proportion on the relative
faults of the parties. Therefore, we hold that
the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony
regarding the relative proportion of fault
between Smith and Mr. Burnett was correct.
CONCLUSION
In summary, even if the trial judge improperly invaded the province of the jury by
granting Smith a partial directed verdict on the
issue of proximate causation, such error was
harmless given the jury's finding that Smith's
subsequent negligent acts were not the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
Further, any error in defining "foreseeability"
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for the jury was rendered harmless by the
jury's
finding
that Smith was negligent
Finally, the trial court correctly excluded
expert testimony which would have improperly
rendered a legal conclusion as to the p r o p o r tion of fault between Smith a n d Mr Burnett
Accordingly, we affirm the jury verdict for
defendant
Judith M Billings, Associate Presiding
Judge
WE C O N C U R
Pamela T G r e e n w o o d , Judge
Norman H Jackson, Judge
1 Although the trial judge both granted a directed
verdict and incorporated his ruling in the court's
jury instructions, we conclude the ruling is most
accurately characterized as a partial directed verdict
A directed verdict makes a determination as to an
element of a cause of action, and takes such determination from the purview of the jury-as was
done here The Utah Supreme Court characterized
the same action of a trial judge as a directed verdict
in Harris v Utah Transit Auth , 671 P 2d 217, 219
(Utah 1983) In Hams, a personal injury action
stemming from a jeep bus collision, the trial judge
instructed the jury that if they found that the defe
ndant jeep driver should have observed the bus,
then they must conclude, as a matter of law, the
jeep driver was the sole proximate cause of the col
hsion, thereby precluding liability stemming from
the bus driver's actions Id On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that this instruction was
in fact a directed verdict and treated it as such The
trial judge's ruling in this case is indistinguishable
from the ruling in Hams, and therefore we likewise
consider the trial court's ruling a directed verdict
and review it accordingly See aiso Cemtos Trucking Co v Utah Venture No i, 645 P 2d 608
(Utah 1982Xmotion for directed verdict tests the
sufficiency of the evidence)
2 See also George v LDS Hosp , 797 P 2d 1117
(Utah App 1990)(in wrongful death action, trial
court improperly took proximate cause from jury on
grounds that nurses' failure to notify doctors of
patient's worsening condition was not proximate
cause because of subsequent intervening negligence)
3 Smith's experts also agreed that these techniques
-deterrence and refraining from using force or
chasing the shophfter-are valid security methods
Their testimony, however, asserted that Smith's
employees had been adequately trained in these
procedures and properly followed the procedures
during the Burnett shoplifting incident
4 Smith's employee manuals contain statements
advocating the use of deterrence techniques in han
dhng shoplifters
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safety in handling shoplifters
Our company policy is that no employee
is to take any action in the apprehension
of a shoplifter which will bring harm to
himself, to other employees, or to cust
omers The most important thing to
remember about apprehending a shopl
ifter is that we do not want anyone
injured There is nothing in the store
that is worth a person getting hurt for
Use common sense, if the situation
can't be properly controlled let the
shoplifter go and attempt to get a license
number
5 We recognize the trial judge's decision finding
Smith owed Mrs Steffensen a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect her from the criminal
acts of third parties was correct Since trial, the
Utah Supreme Court has visited the issue of a shop
owner's duty to protect customers from the criminal
acts of third parties See Dwiggms v Morgan Jew
elers, 811 P 2d 182 (Utah 1991) In Dwiggms, the
Utah Supreme Court adopted section 344 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts stating landowners
have a duty to business invitees to take reasonable
steps to protect invitees from the criminal acts of
third parties where such acts are reasonably forese
eable The Dwiggms court held where a jewelry
store had been robbed only once in ten years, a
robberv is not foreseeable However, Dwiggms is
distinguishable because the store in question was the
most frequently shoplifted store in the Smith's
chain Further, the fact that Smith's employee
manuals advocate the safe handling of shoplifters
demonstrates Smith did in fact, foresee such enm
inal acts Therefore we believe the trial judge pro
perly found that because customer injur) from
shoplifters was torcseeable, the law imposed a dut)
on Smith to take reasonable measures to protect its
customers from injuries resulting from dealing with
shoplifters See also Taco Bell, lnc v Lannon, 744
P 2 d 43, 46-49 (Colo 1987)(store owner had a
duty to take reasonable secunty measures to protect
customers where store had been subject of armed
robbery ten times in past three years)(rehed on by
Dwiggms, 811 P 2d at 183 n 1)
6 Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact " U t a h R E\id 704(1991)

Make sure that employees on the sales
floor are greeting and making eye
contact with customers, especially those
who are acting suspiciously Make use
of the intercom system by calling for
security from time to time Very effec
tive tool, it gives the potential shoplifter
an uneasy feeling that security is in the
store
Similarly, the company manuals also instruct its
employees regarding the importance of customer
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